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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The popular rejection of the European constitution in France and the Netherlands 
triggered much debate in and around the European Central Bank (ECB) concerning 
the long-term viability of the euro. The region of European Monetary Union (EMU) 
member countries has suffered from economic strains for several years: while 
Germany has been in a severe economic downturn since 2001, and thus its 2  RICHARD A. WERNER 
 
government has implored the ECB to adopt more stimulatory monetary policy, other 
countries, such as Ireland and Spain, have been in the midst of an economic boom. 
With the prospect of a slowdown in the political process of forming a United States 
of Europe, a number of observers and policy-makers have begun to review the long-
term viability of the European currency system. In early June 2005, politicians in 
Italy even publicly contemplated the possibility of leaving the euro-system and re-
introducing their domestic currency, thus enabling Italy to conduct its own monetary 
policy, suitable for its own policy goals. Meanwhile, policy-makers in a large 
number of East European and Asian countries continue to favour joining the EMU 
and adopting the euro at the earliest possible date. Given the most recent events and 
discussions, and after several years of experience with the euro, it may be a suitable 
time to reconsider some of the potential benefits and disadvantages for new 
accession countries to join the euro system in the future. 
A comprehensive cost-benefit analysis of joining the euro would include many 
aspects of monetary union, including the ability to achieve domestic policy goals 
such as stable prices, stable growth and low unemployment, as well as an 
assessment of whether the proposed currency union meets the recognized criteria for 
optimal currency areas. Before engaging in such a comprehensive exercise, 
however, potential accession countries need to be certain that the current 
institutional set-up of the ECB is appropriate and likely to achieve its self-declared 
goals. The question potential new entrants to the European monetary system (EMS) 
need to ask is whether, given the empirical record (i.e. the relevant historical 
experience), we can expect the present institutional and legal framework of the ECB 
to provide a suitable incentive structure for achieving the officially declared goals of 
stable prices, stable growth and low unemployment. This is the question considered 
in this chapter. Only if one can answer this question in the affirmative should 
accession to the euro be contemplated and a full-blown cost-benefit analysis be 
conducted. It is thus the purpose of this chapter to focus on the institutional design 
of the ECB in order to reconsider whether the lessons of historical experience have 
been learned. 
2. CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE NOT A 
REQUIREMENT FOR LOW INFLATION 
The Bundesbank is commonly considered one of the most successful central banks 
in the world, and usually the most successful in Europe. Before introduction of the A Comparative Analysis of the Independence of the ECB  3 
 
euro, the Deutsche Mark was the anchor currency of the EMS. After the US dollar, 
it was the second most widely used currency in the world. After the collapse of the 
Iron Curtain, it had quickly become the common currency for international trade in 
Eastern Europe. Several 
Eastern European countries adopted explicit currency boards linked to the Mark, 
while some even adopted the Mark outright as their currency.
2 
Given its generally acknowledged success, it is little wonder that the officially 
declared goal of a common European currency has been to emulate the Deutsche 
Mark, and likewise, for the ECB to be modelled on the Bundesbank. The question 
asked in this chapter is therefore more specifically whether the lessons of the 
Bundesbank have indeed been learned and reflected appropriately in the structure of 
the ECB. 
The main policy mistake made by central banks is usually considered to be 
inflation. Many economists have therefore reduced the definition of successful 
central bank policy to the requirement that there be little inflation. Indeed, during 
much of the postwar era, German inflation has been modest by international 
comparison. Defining the success of the Bundesbank solely by inflation, the next 
step is to identify the reasons for the success of the Bundesbank to achieve low 
inflation. 
A substantial literature makes the claim that the Bundesbank - and indeed any 
other central bank - mainly achieved low inflation due to its legal independence. 
This is the reported result of research on the link between central bank 
independence and inflation (Cukierman, Webb & Neyapti, 1992; Alesina & 
Summers, 1993; Eijffinger, Schaling, & Hoeberichts, 1998), which often claims that 
there is significant empirical evidence for a negative correlation between 
independence and inflation. From this it would appear that the less influence 
governments can exert over central banks, the more stable the currency.
3 The 
scientific evidence in favour of central bank independence that was relied upon in 
the Maastricht Treaty derives from a study commissioned by the European 
Commission itself (Emerson & Gros, 1992). Published under the name ‘‘One 
market, one money,” the study purported to demonstrate that central bank 
independence leads to low inflation. 
However, these findings have been subjected to severe criticism by a number of 
scholars. Forder (1998) finds a large number of severe problems with Emerson and 
Gros (1992). The study arbitrarily selects a number of countries, then arbitrarily 
determines the degree of independence of their central banks and then finds that this 
is correlated with the past inflation performance of the country concerned. There 
were no robustness tests to determine whether the results vary if a different time 
period is used for average inflation or if a different selection of countries is chosen.
4 
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of the countries that were examined is also subject to criticism, such as subjectivity 
bias. Even leaving aside these criticisms, Forder (1998) confirmed whether the 
researchers followed their own definitions of independence and hence were at least 
consistent in their argument - the most basic, necessary but not sufficient 
requirement for scientific research. Correcting for apparent mistakes made by the 
studies used in Emerson and Gros (1992), Forder finds that some of the data points 
from the countries most crucial for obtaining the result suddenly differ. After 
correction, no statistically significant correlation could be detected between 
independence and inflation. The conclusion: The data and method used by the 
economists commissioned by the European Commission do not provide evidence of 
any apparent relationship between central bank independence and inflation. 
Other studies have since confirmed Forder’s conclusion. Mangano (1998) shows 
that the most commonly used indices of central bank independence are subject to a 
rather large subjectivity bias. It is also often argued (Posen, 1998; Forder, 1998; 
Hayo, 1998) that central bank independence and the commitment to a low inflation 
rule is determined jointly and endogenously by social attitudes. Thus independent 
central banks may be successful in implementing low and stable inflation merely 
because their independence reflects a social attitude that supports low inflation. 
Other researchers conducted multi-country tests of the relationship between central 
bank independence and inflation and concluded that there is no evidence that greater 
central bank independence results in lower inflation and price stability (Daunfeldt & 
de Luna, 2003). It must therefore be concluded that central bank independence is not 
shown to be consistently linked to low inflation. 
3. OTHER DEFINITIONS OF SUCCESSFUL CENTRAL 
BANK POLICY 
While it is commonly argued that the success of the Bundesbank is described by its 
inflation record, it is not clear that this statement has been established scientifically. 
Inflation is not the only example of central bank policy mistakes. Japan’s inflation 
rate has been lower than German inflation for much of the post-war era. Hence if 
success is solely defined by low inflation, then the Bank of Japan beat even the 
highly respected Bundesbank at its game. Japanese consumer price inflation 
averaged 1.5 per cent in the last 20 years, compared to 2.5 per cent in Germany. 
Consumer price inflation in the late 1990s even turned negative in Japan, averaging 
0.8 per cent during the 1990s (compared to 2.3 per cent in Germany). Yet, few 
economists would consider Japanese monetary policy a success over the last two 
decades. Especially for the past 15 years Japan’s economy has operated below its 
potential growth rate, resulting in unemployment. Hence the Bank of Japan is not A Comparative Analysis of the Independence of the ECB  5 
 
usually considered a highly successful central bank. This demonstrates that low 
inflation cannot be the sole requirement to measure the success of central bank 
policy. 
Apart from inflation, there appear to be other serious problems that central bank 
policy can create - such as recessions. In this case, inflation may be low, but the 
economy may suffer from large-scale unemployment. Central banks can also create 
deflation, which increases the debt burden of borrowers, such as house owners with 
mortgages. Again, by the measure of absence of inflation, a central bank would have 
been successful. 
Central bank policy can also provide fertile grounds for speculative booms and 
asset inflation. Many economists would argue that central bank policy has been a 
factor in the rise of equity prices in the Nasdaq market, or the movement of real 
estate prices in countries as diverse as the USA, UK, Spain, Australia, the 
Scandinavian countries, Japan and much of Asia. These asset booms are often 
followed by busts and financial crises. 
Systemic banking sector crises, involving significant corporate and financial 
distress and economic dislocation have occurred in many countries during the past 
two decades. Caprio and Klingebiel (1999) identified 93 countries in which a 
systemic financial crisis occurred during the 1980s and 1990s, of which five were in 
industrial countries and the remainder in the developing world. Well-known 
examples include the crises among Scandinavian countries in the 1990s, the 
prolonged Japanese crisis of the 1990s, the Mexican crisis of 1994, the so-called 
Asian financial crisis, involving Thailand, Korea, Indonesia and Malaysia and crises 
in transition economies. In all these instances, consumer price inflation may have 
been low or stable, yet many observers would be reluctant to classify central bank 
policy as ‘‘successful’’. It is apparent that the mainstream definition of successful 
central bank policy is derived from an excessively [on] focus on one area of 
potential central bank error - probably based on the experience of the early 1970s, 
when expansionary central bank policy was a significant cause of inflation in many 
countries (Barsky & Kilian, 2000; IMF, 2000; Werner, 2003). 
In all these cases, central bank policy must be considered unsuccessful. Returning 
to the main focus of attention - the success of the Bundesbank - it becomes apparent 
that its success was not merely characterized by low inflation (as there are other 
countries, such as Japan, with lower inflation), but by the successful avoidance of 
boom-bust cycles, asset inflation and deflation. In general, the Bundesbank not only 
achieved stable prices (including asset prices), but also stable economic growth, 
with a reasonably high capacity utilization (and hence reasonably close to potential). 
German economic growth was fairly high throughout the post-war era, recording 
6 per cent in real terms in the 1950s and 1960s, and averaging 2.7 per cent in the 
1970s, the 1980s and again the 1990s. Unemployment, while rising especially in the 6  RICHARD A. WERNER 
 
mid-1980s and late 1990s, remained significantly below that of other European 
countries.
5 This placed Germany among the best performers of all industrialized 
countries. Moreover, there has neither been a deflationary credit crunch, nor a 
nationwide asset bubble based on excessive speculation in financial investments in 
Germany - as happened in so many other countries the world over. 
It is this broader definition of success that is relevant in order to identify the 
institutional features that may have been responsible for this success, and in order to 
confirm whether these lessons have been learned in the establishment and conduct of 
the ECB. When defining success more broadly to include stable growth and the 
avoidance of cycles and financial crises, what have been the institutional features 
that ensured the Bundesbank’s success? 
4. INDEPENDENCE AND SUCCESSFUL CENTRAL 
BANK POLICIES 
There is no evidence that the central bank policies leading to asset inflation, 
financial crises or deflationary recessions over the past twenty years were mainly 
due to the influence by other players, such as governments. Instead, the relevant 
monetary policies were taken by central banks that were already largely independent 
from government interference concerning their credit quantity policies. This 
suggests that central bank independence alone does not guarantee economic success 
of monetary policy. For instance, no author in the literature suggests that the US 
central bank leadership was influenced by political pressure when it increased credit 
creation steadily throughout the 1990s, thus contributing to asset inflation. 
Meanwhile, research has indicated that the central banks of Thailand and Korea 
independently encouraged the commercial banks to increase lending to the real 
estate sector and set policies that encouraged the corporate sector to borrow from 
abroad.
6 These independent policy mistakes were followed by excessively tight 
credit policies, triggering deep recessions.
7 The case study that has been researched 
in greatest detail is the central bank of the second largest economy in the world: here 
the latest literature shows that the Bank of Japan acted independently when it forced 
the Japanese banks to create the 1980s asset bubble (via its informal ‘‘window 
guidance” credit controls) and when it maintained excessively tight quantitative 
credit policies throughout the 1990s, triggering a prolonged economic slump.
8 
An appropriate analysis of the determinants of the success of German central 
banking must include the question of when this success began. Abstracting from the 
temporary ‘‘Bank der deutschen Laender”, the predecessor of the Bundesbank was 
the Reichsbank. Unlike the Bundesbank, this German central bank is not generally 
credited with successful policies. Therefore, a comparative analysis of the A Comparative Analysis of the Independence of the ECB  7 
 
institutional design and degree of independence of the Reichsbank and the 
Bundesbank should yield some insights into the relevance of legal independence for 
successful monetary policy and the potential identification of other relevant 
institutional features. 
Like the Bundesbank, the Reichsbank was legally independent from the 
government. This independence existed to a great extent de facto since its 
foundation in 1875, because the central bank was largely privately owned and 
accountable to the shareholders.
9 Independence was explicitly written into law in 
May 1922, and lasted until 1939.
10 In August 1924, a new Banking Law again 
confirmed the Reichsbank’s independence from the government - ‘‘but greatly 
increased the influence over the central bank of Germany’s foreign creditors’’.
11 
Thus unlike the Bundesbank, the Reichsbank was also legally independent from any 
other German institution, including the democratically elected parliament. While the 
Reichsbank was totally independent from German democratic institutions, it was 
under the control of the Reparations Commission, which was dominated by Wall 
Street banks.
12 
Thus we find that the Reichsbank was far more independent than the Bundesbank 
ever was. Indeed, at the time the Reichsbank was the most independent central bank 
in history. It is therefore relevant to examine the policy track record of this 
unprecedently independent central bank. As is well known, this track record is not 
impressive. The Reichsbank was responsible for one of the world’s greatest 
inflations, namely the hyperinflation of 1922 and 1923 (in the latter year consumer 
prices rose 2 billion-fold). Subsequently, from the mid-1920s until 1933, the 
Reichsbank adopted highly restrictive policies and implemented a regime of direct 
credit controls, which forced banks to implement credit quotas imposed by the 
central bank. The first phase of credit tightening, between 1924 and 1926, was 
followed by an even worse credit crunch in 1931. Between 1924 and 1930, the 
decisionmaking power over Reichsbank policy was in the hands of one central 
banker, who therefore also became a politically powerful figure in German history, 
the economist Dr. Hjalmar Schacht. While Schacht set interest rates, the true 
monetary policy tool used by him was the quantity of credit, which he used to 
engage in structural policy, as well as regional policy. In other words, the highly 
independent Reichsbank used its powers over the creation and allocation of 
purchasing power in order to pursue political goals which went beyond what would 
normally be considered the mandate of a central bank’s monetary policy. During the 
phase of tight control over the quantity of credit, from 1924 to 1930, Schacht 
pursued the goal to accelerate ‘‘rationalization’’, a process referred to by today’s 
central bankers as “restructuring” and structural change.
13 
When US banks withdrew their deposits from German banks in the aftermath of 
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in their loans to German industry to pay the US depositors. As had been expected, 
industry had invested the funds in plant and equipment. The policies of the 
independent Reichsbank meant that firms had to close down and sell their assets. 
Overnight, mass unemployment was triggered. Germany was thrown into the great 
depression. For those who trust that such disastrous policies will not be repeated, it 
may instructive that the central banks of Thailand, Korea and Indonesia virtually 
followed the extraordinary policies of the Reichsbank 70 years earlier. In a further 
parallel to events of the 1920s, international bankers, this time represented by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), not the Reparations Committee, demanded deep 
structural changes from these Asian nations. 
The economic instability that doomed the Weimar Republic was not only due to 
the substantial separation demands of the victors of the First World War. It was at 
least as much due to an unaccountable central bank that had excessive powers. 
Germany’s first democracy had little chance, since the powers of the government 
were severely limited by the fact that an independent and unaccountable central 
bank set the policies that determined economic growth. Economists concluded that 
the Reichsbank had become a ‘‘second government’’ (Nebenregierung) that acted 
independently from the elected government.
14 The democratically elected 
government was the less powerful one. 
Being independent from the German government did not prevent the Reichsbank 
from adopting the misguided policies of the 1920s and early 1930s that ultimately 
proved fatal for Germany and the world, as they set the stage for the arrival of a pro-
growth party, the NSDAP. It remains to be added that the key central banker, having 
become so powerful due to the institutional design of the Reichsbank, become the 
single most influential person supporting the candidacy of Adolf Hitler as 
Chancellor of Germany. This lesson in the benefits of central bank independence 
serves to remind ourselves that arguing in favour of independent central banks 
effectively is to say that politicians cannot act in the national interest. Only central 
bankers, neutral and objective technical experts as they are, can take decisions for 
the benefit of the people. 
No doubt this is a cynical view of democracy as a system. It was also the view 
taken by the NSDAP, which argued that politicians could not be trusted. It is a view 
that is not without dangers, as it effectively proposes technocratic totalitarianism. 
The evidence suggests that this approach is also naive. The highly acclaimed 
monetary technician Hjalmar Schacht, for one, used his skills and legal powers to 
actively and purposely hand Germany over to Adolf Hitler. He was rewarded for his 
services by being reappointed as head of the Reichsbank from 1933 to 1939 and as 
powerful minister in Hitler’s cabinet.
15 A Comparative Analysis of the Independence of the ECB  9 
 
5. THE INSTITUTIONAL FEATURE RESPONSIBLE 
FOR THE SUCCESS OF THE BUNDESBANK 
This analysis of the legal predecessor of the Bundesbank helps in the quest to 
identify the institutional features that rendered the Bundesbank successful. 
Considering the official goal of monetary policy, it must be recognized that legally 
the Bundesbank was not just required to work towards price stability. In 1967, 10 
years after the founding of the Bundesbank, parliament passed the Stability and 
Growth Act, which clearly set out the objectives of Bundesbank policy as ‘‘price 
stability, a high level of employment, external equilibrium, steady and adequate 
economic growth’’. Put simply, the law mandated the Bundesbank to produce low 
inflation and stable growth. This was also what the Bundesbank had in mind when it 
made its policies. Bundesbank President Klasen, for instance, is said to have 
‘‘accorded economic growth equal priority to monetary stability’’ (Holtfrerich, 
1999, p. 194). 
The Bundesbank is often thought to have been the most independent central bank 
in the world. In reality, the independence of the Bundesbank was clearly limited. 
Firstly, central bank independence was not enshrined in the constitution and was 
thus not irrevocable. Moreover, the Bundesbank was only given “independence from 
government instructions”. When this was formulated, the law makers, presumably 
remembering the lessons from 
Weimar, explicitly warned that this phrase ‘‘of course must not be interpreted to 
mean that the central bank become a state within the state’’.
16 While being 
independent from direct instruction from the government, the Bundesbank was not 
independent from Parliament, which could pass laws or give instructions if it so 
wished. Moreover, it was not independent from other institutions of the Federal 
Republic, but was subject to German laws, was accountable to the federal audit 
agency (Bundesrechnungshof) and the decisions of German law courts. 
But even the independence from the government was limited, for the Bundesbank 
Law also said explicitly that ‘‘it is the duty of the Bundesbank ... while fulfilling its 
tasks to support the general economic policy of the Federal Government”. And there 
is virtually no time period when the government’s main policy aim was not to 
achieve satisfactory economic growth. Despite the inability to give direct 
instructions to the central bank, government representatives could join the policy 
board meetings of the Bundesbank and expect the bank to support their policy 
objectives of nearfull employment. As legal experts point out, if the government 
placed a different emphasis among the goals of the Stability and Growth Act than 
the Bundesbank - for instance by pursuing economic and employment growth - then 
as long as price stability was not neglected, the Bundesbank was obliged to follow 
the policies of the government. Ignoring the goals of the Stability and Growth Act 10  RICHARD A. WERNER 
 
would have been illegal.
17 
There were other incentives embedded in the legal structure that helped make the 
Bundesbank successful. For instance, the Bundesbank had a decentralized structure 
that included representatives of the German states in the policy decision-making, 
which were appointed by the Bundesrat. Moreover, each regional representative was 
in turn advised by representatives of the various occupations, including trade 
unions.
18 As a result, the decisionmaking process of the Bundesbank was usually 
well balanced, reflected the various parts and regions of society, had to take 
government policy into consideration and was subject to legal checks and balances. 
This multi-faceted accountability and consensus orientation produced the 
Bundesbank’s successful monetary policy. There are many instances where the 
government would have liked it to stimulate the economy more, but the Bundesbank 
refused. The downfall of three chancellors - Ludwig Erhard in 1966, Kurt Georg 
Kiesinger in 1969 and Helmut Schmidt in 1982 - was directly or indirectly linked to 
tight Bundesbank policies.
19 Often the government, not the Bundesbank turned out 
to be right.
20 But ultimately there were political limits on the Bundesbank to act 
alone against the interests of the population.
21 
Ironically, it must therefore be concluded that the success of the Bundesbank was 
less due to its independence, but instead to its subtle dependence on the other 
elements of the democratic system. The legal design rendered the central bank 
highly accountable for its policies, and it was always clear that these policies could 
not solely consist of producing low inflation, but had to reflect the goal of stable 
economic growth. By contrast, the Reichsbank’s failure was due to its excessive 
independence without accountability and recourse. Thus comparing the Reichsbank 
and the Bundesbank, we find that the reduction in central bank independence and 
the introduction of accountability and dependence on democratic institutions that 
was undertaken in the post-war period greatly enhanced the performance of central 
bank policy. Contrary to popular opinion, the Bundesbank’s success was due to its 
comparative lack of independence. Thus in order to determine whether the ECB’s 
institutional setting provides for the ingredients of success, as identified from 
German monetary history, one must determine whether the ECB is similarly 
accountable to the people to implement the twin goals of low inflation and stable 
growth. 
6. RESURRECTION OF THE REICHSBANK 
With the introduction of the ECB system, the German government has lost its 
influence over monetary policy. With the creation of the ECB, the Bundesbank Law 
was also revised. In the new Bundesbank Law, the German central bank not only 
became subject to the ECB instructions, but it is also no longer required to support A Comparative Analysis of the Independence of the ECB  11 
 
the general policies of the government.
22 Neither is the ECB required to support the 
policies of the German government. It is, however, required to support the ‘‘general 
policy goals of the European Union (EU)’’. The Maastricht Treaty, which defines 
the role of the ECB, says that the ECB has a primary mandate to maintain stable 
prices. It also says that, ‘‘where it is possible without compromising the mandate to 
maintain price stability’’, the ECB will also support the ‘‘general economic policy 
of the EU’’, which includes, among others, ‘‘steady, non-inflationary and 
environmentally friendly growth’’ and ‘‘a high level of employment’’.
23 
This could be interpreted to mean that the ECB, like the Bundesbank, has to work 
towards the twin goals of low inflation and stable economic growth. However, the 
emphasis is explicitly on price stability. Moreover, unlike in the case of the 
Bundesbank, there are virtually no checks and balances on the actions of the ECB. It 
is therefore practically impossible for anyone, for instance a government, parliament 
or even the (unelected) EU Commission to enforce goals besides price stability. 
Unlike the Bundesbank, the ECB is not only independent from the government, but 
also from parliaments, democratically elected assemblies or other institutions of or 
within the EU. Moreover, the Maastricht Treaty, defining the ECB’s status, includes 
the unprecedented clause that no democratic institution within the EU is even 
allowed to attempt to influence the policies of the ECB, without acting illegally.
24 
This is unprecedented among contemporary democracies. 
In addition, the ECB is far less transparent than the Bundesbank was. For 
instance, the deliberations of its decision-making bodies are secret.
25 It is not 
required to publish the detailed information about its transactions (this requirement 
was also abandoned for the Bundesbank with the establishment of the ECB). While 
it has the power to obtain data from any bank or company in the EU, the ECB is not 
obliged to publicize such or any specific statistics. 
Not surprisingly, the ECB’s statutes are already being interpreted as virtually 
exclusively aimed at price stability. Wim Duisenberg, when he was head of the 
ECB’s predecessor organization, the EMI, told us that he favours ‘‘a single 
monetary policy which strictly aims at price stability in the euro area as a whole’’.
26 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
The ECB is far more independent than the Bundesbank has ever been. It is also far 
more independent than the US central bank, the Federal Reserve, whose legal status 
is far weaker and which is directly accountable to Congress and the government.
27 
We find that the ECB is the least accountable central bank among advanced nations. 
Its degree of independence has only one precedence: the Reichsbank, a central bank 
with one of history’s most disastrous records. 
One must conclude that there is a danger that the incentive structure of the staff at 12  RICHARD A. WERNER 
 
the ECB is not sufficient to guarantee optimal economic policies. This is worrying. 
It suggests that the lessons of German history were not interpreted correctly and the 
ECB was created on the wrong foundations. Instead of adopting those features that 
made the Bundesbank successful - accountability and interdependence with other 
democratic institutions - the creators of the ECB revived the corpse of the 
unaccountable 
Reichsbank. The ‘‘human wisdom nurtured by history’’ (cited by Bank of Japan 
governor Mieno (1994) to support central bank independence, see Bank of Japan, 
1994) tells us that it is dangerous to hand vast powers without checks and 
accountability into the hands of a few unelected officials. Human wisdom is not to 
revive the Reichsbank. But the creation of the ECB seems to have done that. These 
are the issues that any country considering accession to the euro must debate and 
analyse appropriately before coming to a final decision. 
Another issue that remains under-researched concerns the details of monetary 
policy implementation of the ECB. While officially monetary policy is set via 
interest rates, it is apparent that despite the same interest rate for all member 
countries of euroland, very diverse quantity policies are implemented under the 
instruction of the ECB by the various national central banks. For instance, in 2001 
and 2002 the Bundesbank, under orders the ECB, reduced its credit creation by a 
record amount, thereby precipitating a recession in Germany, while at the same time 
the central banks in Ireland and Spain increased their credit creation. While interest 
rates are identical, information value is gained from scrutiny of the quantitative 
credit policies. Furthermore, recent research in macroeconomics suggests that due to 
imperfect information and consequent pervasive market rationing, quantities may in 
any case be more relevant for observers, forecasters and policy-makers (Werner, 
2005). Given these open questions, potential entrants would be well advised to 
engage in further research concerning these issues, before giving up economic 
control to the ECB. 
Economic theory suggests that for potential new entrants to the EMU a 
comprehensive assessment of the costs and benefits is advisable. Before such 
comprehensive analysis can be conducted, it is necessary to determine whether the 
current institutional design of the ECB and control over the euro follows the best 
practice that empirical evidence would suggest, based on the experience of a 
successful central bank, such as Germany’s. This paper first considered the 
definition of “successful” monetary policy, and then engaged in comparative 
institutional analysis in order to identify the true lessons of German central banking 
experience and whether these have been heeded in the design of the ECB. The 
conclusion is devastating: the ECB does not follow the best practice suggested by 
the experience of the Bundesbank. Instead, it is in line with the institutional design 
of one of the least successful central banks in history, the German Reichsbank. This A Comparative Analysis of the Independence of the ECB  13 
 
sounds a strong note of caution, as a number of important issues require further 
research, before a hasty decision is made by any country about handing over 
monetary policy control to the ECB. 
 
 
NOTES 
 
1.  The author is grateful to Dirk Bezemer and James Forder for valuable comments and 
active contribution to this research program. Research assistance by Jim MacDonald and 
support by the Profit Research Center Ltd., Tokyo, are gratefully acknowledged. This paper 
draws heavily on an older version reported in Werner (2003). 
2.  The success of the Bundesbank was so obvious that many observers called its planned 
abolition a ‘‘puzzle’’: ‘‘The Deutsche Mark became the key currency of the EMS and one of 
the world’s major currencies; by the 1980s it was second to the US dollar in terms of the 
proportion of world trade that was invoiced in it. That so much was achieved in such a 
relatively short time makes the history of the currency remarkable. What is perhaps even more 
remarkable is its future. That a currency which achieved so much, and which was for that 
reason so popular with the citizens of the country which used it is to disappear into EMU in 
2002 is, at the least, surprising. An observer who simply saw what had happened ... would be 
as at a loss to understand ... One could not but be surprised that a currency at once a cause and 
a symbol of Germany’s recovery should be abandoned in a democracy.’’ Capie and Wood 
(2001). 
3.  Klaus Stern argues that it is ‘‘right’’ to give independence to central banks, for ‘‘never 
has a central bank destroyed a currency on its own volition’’ (Stern, 1998, p. 183). See also 
other contributors to Baltensperger and Deutsche Bundesbank (1999), such as Neumann, who 
asserts that ‘‘monetary stability cannot be maintained unless governments are prevented from 
gaining access to the country’s money supply’’, p. 275. 
4.  For instance, the study failed to include many members of the EU, such as Austria, 
Luxembourg, Portugal, Ireland and Greece. 
5.  German unemployment averaged 5.3 per cent between 1975 and 1997, compared to 9.1 
per cent for France, 7.1 per cent in Italy and 8.7 per cent in the UK. Data according to the US 
Bureau of Labour Statistics. 
6.  See Werner (2000a, b). 
7.  This time they were influenced - by the IMF. See the letters of Intent. 
8.  Werner (1998, 2002a, 2005). 
9.  Rudolf von Havenstein, for instance, became President of the Reichsbank in 1908 and 
strongly defended the principle of central bank independence. See Stern (1998). 
10.  In January 1939, the Reichsbank Law was changed, the central bank renamed 
Deutsche Reichsbank, and made directly accountable and subordinate to the Reich 
government. 
11.  Marsh (1992). Article 1 of the Banking Law said that ‘‘The Reichsbank is a bank 
independent form the Reich government’’. 
12.  Article 14 gave half of the seats on the Reichsbank’s 14 strong general council to 
foreign members from Britain, France, Italy, Belgium, America, Holland and Switzerland. 
Article 19 established a Commissioner for the note issue, who was required to be a foreigner. 
The appointment of all of the members, including the German ones, fell under the sway of the 14  RICHARD A. WERNER 
 
Reparations Commission and the banks that controlled it (Marsh, 1992). This commission had 
no mandate to operate in the interest of the German people. To the contrary, its job was to 
efficiently extract the Reparations imposed on Germany by the Treaty of Versailles. Officially 
the payments were to the UK and France. But Britain had been vastly indebted to US Wall 
Street banks. Thus the Reparations Commission was staffed with members from JP Morgan 
and other US banks and the reparations payments were dollar denominated. 
13.  For details, see Werner (2002b). 
14.  See, for instance, Bosch (1927); Dalberg (1926); Mueller (1973). 
15.  For an introduction to Schacht’s activities to help Hitler into power, see, for instance, 
Marsh (1992); Weitz (1997); Werner (2003). 
16.  Stern (1998), p. 186. 
17.  See, for instance, Stern (1998), ibid. 
18.  The Bundesbank had two decision-making bodies, the Zentralbankrat, consisting of the 
Direktorium and the Presidents of the state central banks, which decides policy; and the 
Direktorium, consisting of the President, Vice-President and up to six other members, which 
is responsible for implementing this policy. While the Direktorium is suggested by the 
government, the Presidents of the state central banks are proposed by the Bundesrat. 
19.  Marsh (1992). 
20.  For instance, in 1972, when Economics and Finance Minister Karl Schiller correctly 
argued that the excessive credit creation by the USA and massive flight from the dollar should 
be countered by revaluing the Deutsche Mark, the Bundesbank under President Klasen 
refused. The highly popular and hitherto successful minister was forced out of the government 
and resigned. A year later the Bundesbank took exactly his advice. See, for instance, Marsh 
(1992). 
21.  As was clearly seen with German monetary union, the details of which the 
Bundesbank clearly disagreed with. With Karl-Otto Poehl’s resignation it seemed that, for 
once, a Bundesbank president was the one to resign as a result of a disagreement with the 
government, not the chancellor or finance minister. 
22.  The new paragraph in the Bundesbank Law says that the Bundesbank will only support 
the general economic policy of the government as far as this is possible with its task as part of 
the European System of Central Banks (ESCB). 
23.  Protocol no. 3 on the ESCB and the ECB, as well as the Maastricht Treaty, Article 105, 
says that ‘‘the primary objective of the ESCB shall be to maintain price stability. Without 
prejudice to the objective of price stability, the ESCB shall support the general economic 
policies in the Community with a view to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of 
the Community as laid down in Article 2. The ESCB shall act in accordance with the principle 
of an open market economy with free competition, favoring an efficient allocation of 
resources, and in compliance with the principles set out in Article 3a.’’ The goals mentioned 
in Article 3a of the Maastricht Treaty are: stable prices, healthy public finances and general 
monetary conditions, as well as a sustainable current account balance. Article 2 lists as 
purpose of the EU, the harmonious and balanced development of the economy, steady, non-
inflationary and environmentally friendly growth, a high degree of convergence of economic 
performance, a high level of employment, a high degree of social security, the raising of the 
standard of living and the quality of life and the economic and social cohesion and solidarity 
between member states. 
24.  Article 107 establishes an independent and unaccountable apparatus: ‘‘When 
exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and duties conferred upon them by this 
Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB, neither the ECB, nor a national central bank, nor any A Comparative Analysis of the Independence of the ECB  15 
 
member of their decision-making bodies shall seek or take instructions from Community 
institutions or bodies, from any government of a Member State or from any other body. The 
Community institutions and bodies and the governments of the Member States undertake to 
respect this principle and not to seek to influence the members of the decision-making bodies 
of the ECB or of the national central banks in the performance of their tasks. 
25.  Article 108a, 2 says: The ECB may decide to publish its decisions, recommendations 
and opinions. It does not mention the possibility of publicizing the content of the deliberations 
itself, only the results. 
26.  I am convinced that the risks [of Monetary Union] can be contained, if not fully 
avoided, by a high degree of sustainable convergence of those countries which participate in 
Monetary Union, by a single monetary policy which strictly aims at price stability in the euro 
area as a whole, by stability-oriented economic and fiscal policies and by sound wage 
developments in Stage Three.’’ There is no hint that monetary policy will aim at both price 
stability and stable economic growth, as the Bundesbank did. He also said that he interpreted 
the mentioning of the ‘‘general economic policies’’ of the EU as an opportunity, but not an 
obligation for the ECB to give advice. He makes no mention of active support. “Furthermore, 
one may argue that Article 105.1 of the Treaty gives the ESCB the opportunity, if not the 
obligation, to support the general economic policies in the Community also by giving 
appropriate advice to those responsible for these policies and that this advice should be given 
with a view to supporting price stability and an open market economy with free competition, 
favouring an efficient allocation of resources.’’ (Duisenberg, 1998). 
27.  Since the US constitution explicitly assigns the right to issue money to the government, 
a number of scholars even dispute the constitutionality of the Federal Reserve itself. This line 
of reasoning is also supported by well-known US economists. See, for instance, the writings of 
the economist Murray Rothbard, members of the so-called Austrian School of Economics and 
the Ludwig von Mises Institute (http:// www.mises.org/). 
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